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The Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts has rendered 
only one decision, Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,1 that 
explicitly addresses the relationship between antitrust and intellectual property 
rights. But there have been at least five more cases that bear on the broader 
topic of competition policy and intellectual property rights. An interesting 
dynamic emerges from this cluster of opinions: While the antitrust cases apply 
intellectual property rights to justify restraints on competition, a range of 
opinions in three patent decisions call for limits on patent rights and, with 
those limits, effectively open markets to increased competition. Altogether, the 
six cases offer some insights into divergent approaches to the competition 
policies that have developed in these overlapping regimes.2  
Especially for those who correlate progress with open access and 
competitive markets, the divergences summon closer attention to a neglected 
competition policy working within the patent regime as well as to the array of 
competition logics working in the broader domain of intellectual property 
rights. This essay is intended to introduce the outlines of such a project. The 
first section investigates some intersections of antitrust and intellectual 
property policies. It begins with Independent Ink, a tying case that involves a 
patented product, and then proceeds to expose the power of trademark rights to 
shape the antitrust analysis of two price-fixing claims, one involving resale 
price maintenance and the other a joint venture in oil refining and marketing. 
The second section briefly examines three patent cases, which shed light on an 
internal competition policy too often lost in the shadows of the property logic 
that dominates current patent policy analysis. The essay concludes with some 
observations about the crosscurrents of competition policy in the early days of 
the Roberts Court. 
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I. Antitrust and Intellectual Property Rights 
 
Independent Ink was a unanimous decision in which a 1988 
amendment to the Patent Act influenced the Roberts Court to overrule 
longstanding antitrust doctrine and to declare that “the mere fact that a tying 
product is patented does not support . . . a presumption . . . of market power.”3 
As a result, contracts conditioning the sale of patented inventions on the 
purchase of complementary staple products no longer fall into the category of 
per se illegality. In two other cases, the Roberts Court’s antitrust doctrine was 
channeled by the logic of trademark rights. In Leegin Creative Leather 
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,4 a deeply divided Court overruled a venerable 
doctrine of per se illegality in holding that resale price maintenance is to be 
judged by the rule of reason. In Texaco Inc. v. Dagher,5 a unanimous Court 
held that the decision by Equilon Enterprises – a joint venture between Texaco 
and Shell Oil – to sell gasoline at the same price to their separate chains of 
branded service station owners was not per se illegal as a horizontal price 
fixing agreement. The section is intended as an investigation into how antitrust 
policy is viewed through lenses colored by intellectual property rights.  
In Independent Ink, a manufacturer of replacement ink for inkjet 
printers brought an antitrust claim against a patent holder asserting the per se 
illegality of conditioning the sale of patented printer components on the 
purchase of its unpatented ink. In an opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens, the 
Court rejected the claim of per se illegality and held “that, in all [antitrust] 
cases involving a tying arrangement, the plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant has market power in the tying product.”6 While the holding came as 
no surprise, the underlying analysis raises some troubling questions. The 
holding was expected even though the Court overruled precedent from its 1984 
Term because antitrust policy has become largely an expression of price theory 
economics, wherein lies a “virtual consensus” that patents per se do not confer 
market power. As the Court noted, this virtual consensus has been reflected in 
the enforcement agencies’ Intellectual Property Licensing Guidelines since 
1995.7 Moreover, the virtual consensus was corroborated, in the view of 
Justice Stevens, by an 1988 amendment to the Patent Act, which adopted an 
                                                 
3 547 U.S. at 31 (citing 102 Stat. 4674, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)). 
4 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007). 
5 547 U.S. 1 (2006). 
6 547 U.S. at 46. 
7 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines For the 
Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995), available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/atr/public/guidelines>. 
The Roberts Court after two years 
285 
economics-based approach to immunizing such tying provisions from claims 
of patent misuse in the absence of market power.8  
The doctrinal consequence of the Court’s decision is, of course, a turn 
to the rule of reason and, with that shift, proof of market power becomes an 
element of the plaintiff’s case in antitrust tying as well as patent misuse 
claims. In practical terms, private plaintiffs will assert fewer tying claims 
against patentees as a result of the greatly increased cost of litigation and lower 
likelihood of success, a result that tracks antitrust’s broader migration toward 
the rule of reason’s often indeterminate and always expensive economics of 
market definition and competitive effects. Still, it seems to make good sense 
that the illegality of tying arrangements turn on their anti-competitive effects, 
which derive from market power. 
That said, the Court’s analysis raises two related questions. First, why 
presume patents do not confer market power and, second, why proceed on the 
assumption that antitrust treatment of tying should parallel its patent misuse 
counterpart? For the Court, there is a simple answer to both questions found in 
antitrust tying doctrine’s genealogical roots in the federal common law of 
patent misuse and thus in justifiable links to the 1988 amendment to the Patent 
Act; the amendment requires misuse claimants to prove the market power that 
Congress apparently determined patents themselves do not confer. 
The economic rationale for presuming patents do not confer market 
power begins with the indisputable proposition that patents are not necessarily 
economic monopolies, notwithstanding the traditional patent rhetoric of 
monopoly. That is followed by the uncontroversial observation that some 
patents confer more market power than others and, indeed, that the great 
majority of patents have little or no effect on market prices and output. Many 
are what might even be called ‘vanity patents.’ This loosely inductive logic 
asserts the common sense of separating patent rights from the rhetoric of 
monopoly insofar as monopoly is understood to have a purely economic 
definition: Patents per se confer neither economic monopolies nor the lesser 
included advantage of market power.  
Although it drives the dominant approach, this exclusively economic 
logic for understanding patent rights should nevertheless raise doubts for those 
who engage in policy analysis of patents and their relationship to antitrust. 
Here are three: First, a purely economic logic of monopoly abandons the 
cautionary prescription that patents confer a legal monopoly. In common law 
                                                 
8 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5). The opinion’s rendition of that history closely tracks the 
Senate Report. S. REP. 100-83, S. Rep. No. 83, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1987, 1987 WL 
967478 (Leg. Hist. at “Origin and Development of Patent Misuse Doctrine”) (page 
numbers unavailable). The Report discusses the economics of tying solely in terms of 
price discrimination; there is no reference to leverage theory. 
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competition policies and antitrust jurisprudence from the early nineteenth 
century through the 1970s, legal monopoly was taken to mean immunity from 
liability for restraints of trade.9 In the case of patents, their status as legal 
monopolies reminds us that they are statutory exceptions to an underlying 
regime of competition that itself promotes progress.10 Indeed, well-settled 
antitrust doctrine, in its definition of monopoly as the power to exclude 
competitors or raise prices, would include the patent right to exclude as a form 
of monopoly power.11 In jurisprudential terms, this raises doubts about the 
Roberts Court’s abrogation of the Jefferson Parrish doctrine that patents 
confer a form of market power. In doctrinal consequence, the Court’s purely 
economic conception of monopoly leads to the presumption that a patentee’s 
tying provision is a reasonable restraint of competition – in particular, that 
restraining competition in printer ink is presumptively reasonable.12  
The Court’s new presumption of no market power raises a second 
doubt, even within a purely economic conception of patent monopoly: 
Notwithstanding the “virtual consensus among economists,” every valid patent 
by definition does confer some modicum of market power insofar as its 
successful prosecution through the Patent Office requires determinations of 
novelty and non-obviousness.13 In short, a valid patent must embody an 
element of invention which differentiates it from prior art and, thus, from all 
rivals. If the Court intended to defer to the congressional scheme of patent 
rights, the proper question should not have been whether but how much market 
power is conferred: Given the legislative fact that valid patents by statutory 
definition confer some market power, where does a particular invention lie 
along a spectrum of differentiation that runs from pioneering patents to minor 
improvements, from the integrated circuit to what might be called a ‘vanity 
patent’? And if the question were one of how much market power, why would 
the Court presume the equivalent of a ‘vanity patent,’ especially in the context 
                                                 
9 See Peritz, “Nervine and Knavery,” infra note 24, for discussion of legal monopoly. 
10 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989), cited 
by Justice Breyer in his Metabolite dissent, 126 S.Ct. at 2926. 
11 U. S. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). 
12 This view of antitrust as a junior partner can also be seen in other recent decisions, 
most clearly in Verizon Comm., Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004), given the 
presence of an antitrust savings clause in the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
Compare the opinion of the European Court of First Instance in Microsoft, (Case T-
201/04 17 Sept.2007), in which the court stated explicitly that even where an 
intellectual property right is exploited in a lawful manner under the IP laws, it may 
still be unlawful under the competition rules prohibiting an abuse of dominance. 
13 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103. If the Court were truly concerned with the triviality of many 
patents, the proper course is to raise the requirements for patentability. Indeed, the 
Court has addressed that issue in KSR, discussed in the text at notes 42-50 infra. 
The Roberts Court after two years 
287 
of an expensive law suit over the commercial exploitation of patents, a case in 
which the patent holder is making a substantial investment in asserting the 
legal right to exclude and the antitrust challenger feels sufficient effects of 
market power to make worthwhile the expense and risk of a lawsuit? And so 
the Court’s presumption of no market power seems to run afoul the statutory 
requirements for patentability as well as the particular economic circumstances 
of such cases.  
Finally, I want to address a third doubt raised by the Roberts Court’s 
antitrust presumption that patents do not confer market power: Closer attention 
could have been paid to the economics of tying. While the Court made its 
series of references to a “virtual consensus” among antitrust economists, this 
consensus has shown deep fault lines for some time. Indeed, such fissures are 
reflected in respondent’s arguments that two characteristics of the tying 
arrangement under scrutiny reflect circumstances that call for a rebuttable 
presumption of market power.  
Respondents argued, first of all, that the tying arrangement itself 
should be taken as evidence that the patent confers sufficient market power to 
impose the provision. This argument is entirely consistent not only with the 
economic circumstances but also with the well-settled antitrust doctrine that 
direct evidence of coercive conduct supports a claim of market power.14 
Respondents argued, secondly, that the evidence also supports a rebuttable 
presumption in the narrower circumstance of a “requirements tie,” – an 
“arrangement involving the purchase of unpatented goods over a period of 
time.” A requirements tie in permitting sellers to charge higher prices to 
heavier users is thus “a form of discrimination that is ‘strong evidence of 
market power.’”15 The Court rejected these arguments on questionable 
grounds. To begin, the Court oddly declared that the argument was not 
supported by the International Salt case, whose approach the Court had just 
overruled and so was entirely without precedential power. Second, the Court 
rejected the argument for a rebuttable presumption on the economic grounds 
that since price discrimination cannot occur in competitive markets, it is not 
evidence of market power. But price discrimination can occur in competitive 
markets and still evidence market power. The question is one of degree – not 
whether there is competition but how imperfect the competition is.16 The 
answer to a question of degree begins with process, with allocating the burden 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 477 
(1992); Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Or. v.Weyerhaeuser Co., 411 F.3d 
1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 2005). 
15 547 U.S. at 44. 
16 For a similar approach to the question of anti-competitive effects, see Justice 
Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2729-30. 
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of proof. As described in a lucid Amicus Brief, not only is this sort of price 
discrimination evidence of market power, but the practice produces anti-
competitive effects.17 In this light, the patent-holder should carry a burden of 
rebutting a presumption of market power.  
The practical result in International Ink is the patentee’s presumptive 
power to exclude competition from a secondary market by tying the sale of 
patented components to the purchase of ink, a staple product available from 
numerous competitors. The Court’s purely economic conception of monopoly 
power, together with its questionable treatment of respondent’s price 
discrimination arguments, raises serious doubts about the adequacy of its 
rationale for overturning the Jefferson Parish presumption that patents confer 
market power. 
There remains the second question raised by the International Ink 
decision’s new doctrine for resolving the question of a patent’s market power 
in tying cases: Why conclude that the antitrust doctrine of tying should parallel 
its patent misuse counterpart? In the Court’s view, “given the fact that the 
patent misuse doctrine [since 1917] provided the basis for the market power 
presumption, it would be anomalous to preserve the presumption in antitrust 
after [the 1988 amendment to the Patent Act] has eliminated its foundation.”18 
But this logic seems tenuous, for at least two reasons.  
First, it was perhaps disingenuous for the Court to state: “It would be 
absurd to assume that Congress intended to provide that the use of a patent that 
merited punishment as a felony would not constitute ‘misuse.’”19 Although the 
Court was correct in the abstract because tying is an offense under the 
Sherman Act, Justice Department practice has long reserved criminal 
prosecution for price fixing cartels; it is common knowledge that the agency 
simply does not pursue criminal charges for tying arrangements. 
Second, the Court accepted an imagined invitation by Congress to 
reappraise the doctrine after a lapse of twenty years. Most would say that the 
invitation expired long ago, whether by way of an equitable doctrine of laches 
and reasonable reliance or simply the passage of time and changed 
circumstances. Moreover, the Court could have learned that there was no 
                                                 
17 Brief for Barry Nalebuff, Ian Ayres and Lawrence Sullivan as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondent, 2005 WL 2427646 (Sept. 28, 2005). See also, Rudolph J.R. 
Peritz, Dynamic Efficiency, in POST-CHICAGO DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW 108 
(London: Elgar Press 2002) (Cuccinota, A., Pardolesi, R. & Van den Bergh, R., eds.) 
(European Association of Law and Economics). These anticompetitive effects are not 
recognized by the statics approach of neo-classical price theory dominating current 
antitrust jurisprudence. Nalebuff, et al, supra. 
18 547 U.S. at 42. 
19 Id. 
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invitation at all: Congress explicitly chose not to equate patent misuse under 
the 1988 amendment with antitrust tying by rejecting the prior Senate bill sent 
to conference, which did equate the two in language stating there would be no 
misuse “unless such practices . . . violate the antitrust laws.” The conference 
bill as enacted eliminated that equation because, according to the House 
Conference Report, patent misuse and antitrust prohibitions were overlapping 
rather than identical.20 The Conference Report couldn’t make it any plainer 
that the change to the statutory language in Section 271 (d)(5) was not 
intended to affect extant antitrust doctrine. In practical terms, the amendment’s 
new requirement of proving power in the market for the patent or the patented 
product does not necessarily or impliedly correlate with the antitrust approach 
to market power, and certainly not with a full-blown antitrust rule of reason. 
There is strong evidence that Congress rejected an opportunity to equate patent 
misuse and antitrust tying and, with that rejection extended instead an 
invitation to maintain the separation between the two doctrines. 
Moreover, the House Conference Report accompanying the final bill 
as enacted observed that patent misuse was founded on the equitable doctrine 
of unclean hands.21 Congress understood misuse not as comprising an entirely 
economic determination but rather as having a normative component that 
deems certain conduct illegal because it extends a patent’s power beyond the 
statutory realm of legal monopoly and into the domain of trade restraints. 
Misuse policy is not a consumer welfare matter of proving anticompetitive 
effects but one of keeping legal monopolies within their statutory boundaries. 
Although the Roberts Court cites the Patent Act as highly influential if not 
authoritative for its shift to the antitrust presumption that patents do not reflect 
market power and, thus, for its shift to a rule of reason, the shift actually 
                                                 
20 Senate Report, supra note 8, at “IX. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW.” The House 
Conference Report that accompanied passage of P.L. 100-418, OMNIBUS TRADE 
AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988, said very little, though what was said is 
instructive: “Present law[:] Patent misuse is a common law doctrine that has its roots 
in the equitable doctrine of unclean hands. Section 271 of Title 35, U.S. Code, 
provides that certain narrowly described activities of a patent owner shall not be 
considered patent misuse. Although some misuses of patents may constitute antitrust 
violations, others do not. House bill[:] No provision. Senate amendment[:] Amends 
Title 35 to provide that a patent owner's licensing practices will not constitute patent 
misuse unless they violate the antitrust laws. Conference agreement [:] The Senate 
recedes to the House.” H.R. CONF. REP. 100-576, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 576, 100th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. 1988, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 2124 (Leg. Hist.). 
21 Id; Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 183, 196 (1980); B. 
Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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derives not from patent policy or jurisprudence but rather from a mindset 
influenced by mainstream antitrust economics.22  
Patent misuse and its connection to the doctrine of unclean hands has 
always been part of the larger equitable framework for patent rights, including 
not only other equitable defenses but also the core equitable remedy of 
injunction.23 Although patent misuse and antitrust tying have an intertwined 
history, they have been two separate causes of action with their own 
underlying competition policies. In short, patent misuse has traditionally been 
seen as regulating conduct that ranges between legitimate use and antitrust 
violations, and perhaps beyond. Accordingly, there has always been a different 
remedy for a different offense: Unlike antitrust remedies of treble damages and 
injunctive relief, patent misuse gives rise to suspension of patent rights until 
the misuse has been ‘purged.’ Despite their genealogical connection, patent 
misuse and antitrust tying are anything but identical – something that Congress 
preserved but the Court neglected.  
 Two antitrust cases, both involving price fixing, illustrate the impact 
of trademark protection. These are discussed more summarily as offering 
further insight into how intellectual property rights channel antitrust doctrine. 
In Leegin, a deeply divided Court overruled the century-old Dr. Miles 
Medical decision24 that held minimum resale price maintenance per se illegal. 
The landmark case had been on shaky ground since the Khan decision (1997) 
                                                 
22 This antitrust mindset can be contrasted to that reflected in the recent European 
Microsoft case, available at <http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-
bin/form.pl?lang=EN&Submit=rechercher&numaff=T-201/04>. There, the European 
Court of First Instance confirmed the European Commission’s determination that, 
under exceptional circumstances, competition policy can trump IP rights. The 
exceptional circumstances turned on the question of access to an indispensable asset 
controlled by a dominant firm, there Windows protocols controlled by Microsoft. The 
protocols amounted to an essential facility for entry into the intranet server market. For 
a brief discussion, see Rudolph J. R. Peritz, The Microsoft Chronicles: Neelie Crows, 
Barnett Bellows While Information Flows, or Not, presented at Colloquium on Pro-
Consumer Efficiencies in Antitrust Law & Practice: U.S., E.U., Japan, LUISS Guido 
Carli University, Rome, Italy, 26 October 2007; forthcoming in Microsoft e il flusso di 
informazioni. Note (comparatistiche) dal fronte antitrust/proprietà intellettuale, 10 
MERCATO, CONCORRENZA, REGOLE (2007) (Ital. trans.). 
23 The eBay decision and the equitable remedy of injunction are discussed in the text 
accompanying notes 50-54 infra.  
24 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); for fuller 
discussions, see Peritz, Nervine and Knavery: The Life and Times of Dr. Miles 
Medical Company, in ANTITRUST STORIES, E. Fox & D. Crane, eds. (St. Paul: West 
Publishing, 2007); Peritz, A Genealogy of Vertical Restraints, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 511 
(1989). 
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concluded that maximum resale price maintenance is to be judged under the 
rule of reason.25 
Writing for the Leegin majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy concluded 
that an economic consensus called for revocation of the per se rule in Dr. 
Miles: “[I]t suffices to say here that economics literature is replete with 
procompetitive justifications for a manufacturer's use of resale price 
maintenance.”26 In short, deference to longstanding precedent was outweighed 
by the fashionable economic logic that price restraints on intrabrand 
competition can be reasonable because they promote interbrand competition. 
But Justice Stephen Breyer and his three fellow dissenters insisted that Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion for the bare Majority paid insufficient respect to the 
doctrine of stare decisis as the result of overstating the asserted economic 
consensus and neglecting the fact that Congressional repeal of the fair trade 
statutes in 1975 was “premised upon the existence of [the Dr. Miles] rule [and 
thus] constitutes important public reliance upon that rule.”27 
 Nevertheless, despite the deep division, all nine Justices applied what 
has become the standard framework for analyzing vertical restraints by 
manufacturers: the distinction between interbrand and intrabrand competition 
and, with it, the property logic of trademark rights that underlies product 
branding. Indeed, no one questions the proposition that “[t]he promotion of 
interbrand competition is important because ‘the primary purpose of the 
antitrust laws is to protect [this type of] competition.’”28 Since the GTE 
Sylvania (1977) decision, brand ownership through trademark rights has 
provided the property logic for manufacturers to restrain competition in 
branded goods they no longer own or possess so long as they own the brand.29 
 Ever since passage of the Sherman Act, federal courts have struggled 
with the question of manufacturers’ restraints on distribution and sale of their 
branded products. The question of reasonable restraints early involved two 
intertwined elements – contractual restraints and intellectual property rights. 
There was no clear rule regarding contractual restraints of trade until the Dr. 
Miles decision prohibited resale price maintenance in the absence of a well-
                                                 
25 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
26 127 S.Ct. at 2710, 2714. 
27 Id. at 2732. 
28 Id. at 2716 (quoting Khan, 522 U.S. at 15). 
29 Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Until GTE Sylvania, 
the property logic of vertical restraints resided in the consignment contract’s retention 
of title in the goods. The power of the title holder to restrain competition was 
recognized in Dr. Miles, which rejected the prior property logic that trade secret or 
trademark ownership permitted restraints on alienation or contractual restraints of 
trade. See Peritz, Nervine, supra note 24. 
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scrivened consignment agreement. Before then, large manufacturers of patent 
medicines met with mixed success in asserting arguments that intellectual 
property rights should immunize from antitrust liability resale price 
maintenance provisions in sales contracts.30 After Dr. Miles, the property logic 
of consignment, which allowed manufacturers to retain title after giving up 
possession of the goods, would justify immunity from antitrust liability until 
the latter half of the twentieth century, when the Supreme Court would close 
the exception, re-open it, and close it emphatically in GTE Sylvania (1977), 
only to suggest later that an opening remained.31  
 It was the White Motor (1963) decision that first created a separate 
category for non-price restraints in a case which involved a small 
manufacturer. Whether in a consignment or a straight sales contract, White 
Motor Company was permitted to impose non-price restraints on its dealers 
when it showed that the restraints enhanced competition against General 
Motors, Chrysler and Ford. Such restraints were no longer considered per se 
illegal and would be judged under the rule of reason. The Court’s implicit 
commercial predicate was that White Motor could not compete on price 
against the Big Three because it could not match their economies of scale. The 
small manufacturer would fail without dealer restraints to enforce its plan to 
compete on quality against other brands – its plan to differentiate its brand. In 
practical terms, interbrand competition was clearly more important in those 
particular circumstances because, without success against the Big Three, 
intrabrand competition among White Motors dealers would be moot.32  
After almost twenty-five years of wobbling, the Court in GTE 
Sylvania returned to a view consistent with White Motor, the view that the per 
                                                 
30 Federal Courts tended to permit contractual restraints on sales of goods involving 
patent rights, while the outcomes were mixed on sales of goods involving trademark 
and trade secret rights. See Peritz, Nervine, supra note 25. An earlier case, Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908) (establishing the ‘first sale’ doctrine), had 
already declared limits on resale price maintenance involving copyrighted books; the 
price restraints were imprinted on the books themselves rather than expressed in 
contracts with retailers and were thus restraints on alienation rather than contractual 
restraints of trade. Dr. Miles would permit the former only when the property logic of 
consignment allowed that the goods had not been sold, allowing a manufacturer to 
retain title and thus exert ownership rights on its property; there would be no resale 
price maintenance at retail because there had been no prior sale. The Court found a 
restraint of trade in Dr. Miles because the faulty consignment agreement devolved into 
a contract of sale. See Peritz, supra. 
31 GTE Sylvania, supra note 29; Bus. Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 484 
U.S. 717, 733 (1988) (suggesting viability of consignment-sale distinction); see Peritz, 
Genealogy, supra note 24, at 511-16, 531-37, 550, 562-67. 
32 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). 
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se (il)legality of non-price restraints should not turn on the distinction between 
consignments and sales contracts. Adopting a rule of reason for non-price 
restraints regardless of the contractual form, the Court abandoned the property 
logic of consignment for a property logic of trademark ownership in 
announcing that interbrand competition – that is, brand development – is 
simply more important than intrabrand competition. In GTE Sylvania, the 
Court’s determination that interbrand trumped intrabrand competition in cases 
involving struggling firms was expanded into a general proviso that interbrand 
competition is antitrust’s primary concern in all cases of vertical non-price 
restraints. Twenty years later, Khan (1997) further extended the property logic 
of trademark ownership rights to justify maximum resale price maintenance in 
the name of interbrand competition.  
 With the Roberts Court’s Leegin decision, the powerful property logic 
of trademark ownership now drives the entire body of vertical restraints 
doctrine toward privileging the commercial strategy of branding and product 
differentiation. Asserted unsuccessfully in the Dr. Miles era, trademark 
ownership and competition by product brand development now directs the 
Supreme Court to view markets as bifurcated, as working at distinct levels of 
intrabrand and interbrand competition. At one level, trademark ownership 
presumptively permits manufacturers to impose both price and non-price 
restraints on downstream sales of their branded goods. At the other level, 
increasingly concentrated markets and cooperative game strategies soften 
competition among manufacturers.33  
Does trademark policy promote its own, internal competition policy? 
Unlike the public interests underwriting patent and copyright, trademark 
protection is not justified by a role in encouraging invention. The Supreme 
Court observed long ago that a trademark does not “depend on novelty, 
invention, discovery, or any work of the brain. It requires no fancy or 
imagination, no genius, no laborious thought.”34 Rather, the orthodox 
economic justification for trademark protection rests on production of market 
information and its value in decreasing consumer search costs, its value in 
improving competition on the merits by preventing mistake, confusion, or 
deception regarding the origin of goods. More recently, courts have come to 
                                                 
33 For discussion of cooperative game strategies, see Peritz, Doctrinal cross-dressing 
in derivative aftermarkets: Kodak, Xerox and the copycat game, 51 ANTITRUST BULL. 
215 (2006); Peritz, Toward a Dynamic Antitrust Analysis of Strategic Market 
Behavior, 47 N.Y.L.S. L. Rev. 101(2003). 
34 The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). 
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view the social value of trademarks more expansively, as including not only an 
indication of origin but also a guarantee of quality.35 
Yet since the pioneering work of economist Edward Chamberlin, 
economists in the United States have disagreed about the competitive effects 
of brand differentiation and, thus, of trademark protection. Chamberlin offered 
the strongest criticism, arguing that trademark rights were barriers to 
competition that artificially differentiated products, elevated costs, and created 
power to raise prices for products that are functionally identical. In this light, 
advertising and other forms of brand differentiation harm consumers. More 
recently, many economists have come to believe that advertising 
communicates useful information to consumers. Because advertising embodies 
both tendencies, it should come as no surprise that a dissensus persists 
regarding the economic role of trademarks and their impact on competition.36 
But this ambivalence is not reflected in the antitrust doctrine of 
vertical restraints, which has uniformly adopted a powerful “free rider” 
presumption to characterize price discounters and, with it, a benign neglect of 
the anticompetitive effects that trademarks and interbrand markets can 
produce. The “free rider” presumption in its current form derives from a 
property logic of protecting investment in trademarks rather than the 
trademark regime’s internal competition policy insofar as antitrust courts do 
not ask whether there is in fact free riding or, if there is, whether it actually 
confuses or otherwise harms consumers and thus produces anticompetitive 
effects. Were antitrust courts to address these questions, attention to the 
trademark regime’s internal competition policy would lead to a more careful 
analysis of the relationship between intrabrand and interbrand competition. I 
leave further exploration of that problematic to another day. 
                                                 
35 See, e.g., Reddy Communications v. Environment Action Found’n, 477 F.Supp.936 
(D.D.C. 1979). 
36 See, e.g., Richard Schmalensee, Advertising and Market Structure, in NEW 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 373 (Joseph Stiglitz & G. 
Frank Matthewson, eds. 1991); EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF 
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1932); Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Innovation Economics and 
U.S. Antitrust Law, in POST-CHICAGO DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW (A. 
Cucinotta, R. Pardolesi, R. Van den Bergh, eds.) (London, U.K.: Elgar Press, 2002); 
Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 
YALE L.J. 1687 (1999); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Price and Advertising Signals 
of Product Quality, 94 J.POL.ECON. 796 (1986); J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks 
and Unfair Competition §2.10-11(4th ed. 2001). Compare Lee Bentham, The Effect of 
Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L.& ECON. 337 (1972)(advertising 
correlates with lower prices) with John A. Rizzo, Advertising, and Competition in the 
Ethical Pharmaceutical Industry, 42 J.L.& ECON. 89 (1999)(drug advertising reduces 
consumer sensitivity to price). 
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The property logic of trademark ownership also emerges in the 
Roberts Court’s Dagher decision, which is generally understood as involving 
horizontal price fixing. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Clarence 
Thomas treated Equilon Enterprises as “a lawful, economically integrated joint 
venture” between Texaco and Shell Oil, a view which made good sense in 
light of the joint venture’s prior approval by the Federal Trade Commission.37 
The Court held that the decision by Equilon to sell separately branded gasoline 
at the same price to Texaco and Shell service station owners was not per se 
illegal horizontal price fixing.38 
Once the antitrust question was defined as conduct by “a lawful, 
economically integrated joint venture,” the case was easy pickings, as reflected 
by the Court’s unanimity. It was easy because that antitrust doctrine is well-
settled: Ever since the BMI (1979) case, economically integrated joint ventures 
have been treated as entities separate from their partnering corporations. 
Writing for the BMI Court, Justice Byron White characterized the blanket 
licenses as new products that BMI and ASCAP formulated from the raw 
materials of individual copyrighted musical compositions.39 Hence, in the 
Court’s view, the price was set by the joint ventures for their own blanket 
licenses rather than for bundles of compositions owned by third parties. 
Accordingly, ASCAP and BMI created an entirely new product market with 
new efficiencies; at the same time, copyright holders granted ASCAP and BMI 
only non-exclusive licenses, which maintained for CBS and other potential 
licensees the old market alternative of bargaining with individual copyright 
holders for their compositions.  
But Equilon did not produce a new product from input materials 
provided by Texaco and Shell; nor did the two joint venturing partners create a 
new market while permitting their separately branded station operators a 
choice of entering the new market or remaining in an old market with 
numerous individual petroleum suppliers. In practical terms, the joint venture 
under the trade name “Equilon Enterprises” transformed interbrand 
competition into intrabrand restraints at the wholesale level, even though sales 
proceeded under the separate brands of Texaco and Shell. The Dagher 
decision presumptively permits Texaco and Shell through Equilon to set the 
wholesale prices for their branded retailers and, then, Khan and Leegin 
presumptively permit Texaco and Shell, with exact knowledge of wholesale 
prices, individually to set the resale prices for the separately branded 
                                                 
37 Dagher, 547 U.S. at 4 (citing In re Shell Oil Co., 125 F.T.C. 769 (1998)). 
38 Id. at 8. 
39 BMI v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, (1979); compare Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. 
Soc., 457 U.S. 333 (1982) (holding per se illegal price agreements by a joint venture 
not economically integrated). 
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petroleum products that Equilon produced. Beyond the anti-competitive effects 
sanctioned by this antitrust regime, if the purpose of trademark protection is 
the production of market information to improve competition on the merits by 
preventing mistake, confusion, or deception regarding the origin of goods, then 
this decision and its consequences have betrayed that purpose in the name of 
competition policy.40 
 
In these three decisions, the Roberts Court has announced antitrust doctrine 
that permits manufacturers greater power to restrain downstream competition 
and greater opportunities to coordinate marketing strategies with their 
competitors. In each, intellectual property rights have come into play. After 
Independent Ink, the patent holder has a presumptive right to restrain 
competition by conditioning the sale of a patented invention on the purchase of 
a staple, undifferentiated product that is widely available in competitive 
markets. After Leegin, the trademark owner has a presumptive right to engage 
in resale price maintenance of its branded goods, though it no longer owns or 
possesses them so long as it holds the goodwill. And in Dagher, a joint venture 
under the new trade name “Equilon Enterprises” has turned what was 
interbrand competition between Texaco and Shell into their presumptive right 
through the joint venture to set wholesale prices for goods sold to the two 
partners’ branded retailers, whose resale prices are then subject to restraint by 
the two partners under Leegin. These three antitrust decisions reflect the 
property logics of two intellectual property regimes but not their internal 
competition policies, policies whose recognition might lead an antitrust court 
to an understanding of competition policy more broadly conceived. 
 
II. Patents and Competition Policy 
 
While the Roberts Court in three antitrust cases applied intellectual 
property rights to allow restraints on competition, a range of opinions in three 
patent cases call for limits on their exclusionary logics and effectively seek to 
open the door to increased competition.  
 The trio of patent cases address fundamental issues of patent policy. A 
unified Court in KSR expanded the scope of prior art to be considered in 
evaluating a combination patent and, in so doing, raised the level of creativity 
needed to meet the statutory requirement of non-obviousness.41 Articulating 
another unanimous decision, the eBay opinion pointedly reminded the Federal 
Circuit that a permanent injunction for patent infringement is an equitable 
                                                 
40 Of course, I do not intend to suggest that it was the property logic of trademark 
ownership alone that produced this result. 
41 KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727, 1742 (2007). 
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remedy that calls on the court to apply the traditional balancing test.42 And in 
his dissent from the Metabolite decision to dismiss a writ of certiorari as 
improvidently granted, Justice Stephen Breyer explicated the basic premise 
that “patent protection [excludes] . . . laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas.”43 These opinions are discussed for the limited purpose of 
revealing their normative commitments to a pervasive competition policy 
underlying the patent regime. 
 The Court in KSR took issue with the Federal Circuit’s 
“transform[ation of a] general principle into a rigid rule that limits the 
obviousness inquiry.” The patent principle holds that a combination is obvious 
to “a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field” when the prior art 
“demonstrate[es] a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine known 
elements” into that combination.44 The Federal Circuit rigidified the principle 
“by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit 
content of issued patents.” This approach failed to take account of “common 
knowledge and common sense,” which consider a larger body of public 
knowledge, including “design need and market pressure,” knowledge which 
seldom finds its way into the literature of prior art. Justice Kennedy observed 
that a “person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an 
automaton.” 45 This observation brings to the fore the difficulty of separating 
ordinary creativity from the non-obvious type because “inventions in most, if 
not all, instances rely upon building blocks long since uncovered, and claimed 
discoveries almost of necessity will be combinations of what, in some sense, is 
already known.”46  
The practical question, then, is what to do about the great bulk of 
inventions, which lie in the bandwidth between the ordinary and the non-
obvious. There has been mounting criticism of the Federal Circuit’s approach 
to that question and the resulting demands on the Patent Office, demands 
which have led to a standard that has diminished the non-obviousness 
requirement to the level of triviality.47 In expanding the range of references for 
                                                 
42 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837 (2006). 
43 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S.Ct. 2921, 2922 (2006) 
(Justice Breyer, dissenting). 
44 127 S.Ct. at 1741, 1742. 
45 Id. at 1743 (citing DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. 
Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
46 Id. at 1741. 
47 See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER 
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (Oct.2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/ 10/innovationrpt.pdf (as visited December 4, 2007); See 
also, John H. Barton, Non-Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475 (2003); Antitrust and the New 
Economy: Comments to the Antitrust Modernization Commission, Washington, D.C., 
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determining prior art, the Court in KSR raised the level of non-obviousness 
required for patentability. Now, a combination may be found non-obvious 
even without a “teaching, suggestion or motivation to combine known 
elements” in the prior art. 
It should be noted that the very process of determining non-
obviousness in the course of patent application can be understood as a contest 
in ideas, a competition between prior art and the prosecuted invention. The 
question of non-obviousness asks whether the invention embodies a new idea 
that surpasses prior art. KSR raises the level of difficulty for the new arrival to 
win this competition in ideas.48 
On the assumption that the heightened standard will result in a class of 
combination inventions that met the old standard for non-obviousness but fail 
the new one, what are the likely effects? Some of the newly obvious 
combinations, especially those involving processes, can be hidden from public 
view and thus their owners can seek protection as trade secrets. In this 
instance, public information about such combinations will be lost until the 
secrets are discovered. Owners of newly obvious combinations which are self-
disclosing on sale or use will proceed in reliance on first-mover advantages or 
simply on the benefits of the new combination when they outweigh the 
competitive costs of imitation by others. The resulting mix of secret and public 
combinations is an empirical question. Nonetheless, KSR’s heightened 
standard for non-obviousness increases the play of competition, either 
immediately by direct imitation or eventually by investigation, independent 
discovery, or reverse engineering. The Court has expanded the scope of 
innovation by “ordinary creativity” and, with it, access to innovation that 
patent protection denied to competitors under the old rule.49 
                                                                                                                     
available at http://www.amc.gov (Working Group on the New Economy, American 
Antitrust Institute) (July 2005) 
48 The statutory requirement of usefulness assures that the invention is not a 
disembodied idea. 35 USC § 101. For further discussion of this point, see Peritz, 
“Patents and Progress,” infra note 55. 
49 The extent of access to competitors under the new approach deserves further 
comment insofar as it depends on the character of prior art embodied in the combined 
elements. If no elements are protected by patents still in force, then access to the new 
combination is entirely free and competition is simply extended. If, however, any 
element is still protected, then use of the new combination requires a license from each 
patent holder. But no patent license is required to practice the combination. The net 
effect in either case is free access to the combination and, with it, lower bargaining and 
licensing costs. In all circumstances, however, the intervention of trade secret 
protection must be taken into account, with consequences as described in the 
discussion accompanying this footnote. 
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 The Court in eBay again spoke in a unified voice to reject another 
important instance of the Federal Circuit’s rigid jurisprudence of expansive 
patent rights, this time its “general rule that courts will issue permanent 
injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances.” In 
rejecting this general rule, the Court held that issuance of permanent 
injunctions summons “familiar principles [of equity that] apply with equal 
force to disputes arising under the Patent Act.”50 Justice Thomas’ opinion for 
the Court provides a clear and unembellished basis for a more flexible 
approach: 
 
As this Court has long recognized, “a major departure from the long tradition 
of equity practice should not be lightly implied.” Nothing in the Patent Act 
indicates that Congress intended such a departure. To the contrary, the Patent 
Act expressly provides that injunctions “may” issue “in accordance with the 
principles of equity.”51 
 
 While the opinion for the Court does not venture beyond the statutory 
text and equity doctrine to make plain the outcome, two concurring opinions 
offer differing policy analyses for support. Both address an issue raised in the 
opinion by Justice Thomas, in a passage that rejected the Federal Circuit’s 
reasoning for its general rule for issuing permanent injunctions. The Federal 
Circuit had concluded that the Patent Act’s explicit definition of a patent as 
“having the attributes of personal property,” particularly “the right to exclude 
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention . . . alone 
justifies its general rule.” It was here that Justice Thomas quoted the statutory 
language that provides for the discretion associated with traditional equity 
practice, observing that “the creation of a right is distinct from the provision of 
remedies for violations of that right.”52 The two concurring opinions assert 
sharply different rationales for treating the distinction between the 
exclusionary nature of property rights and the exclusionary remedy of 
injunction. 
Chief Justice Roberts understood the relationship between right and 
remedy reflected in the statutory provisions to be reflected in a “long tradition 
of equity practice” to grant injunctions “upon a finding of infringement in the 
vast majority of patent cases” on account of “the difficulty of protecting a right 
to exclude through monetary damages that allow an infringer to use the 
                                                 
50 126 S.Ct. at 1839 (both quotations in the paragraph). 
51 Id. (citations omitted). 
52 Id. at 1840 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 261, 154(a)(1)).  
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invention against the patentee’s wishes.”53 In sum, Justice Roberts was 
instructing federal judges not to stray from that “long tradition” of recognizing 
patents as fundamentally property rights to exclude, rights to empower 
individual choice about how to practice the invention, or whether to practice it 
at all, property rights that are understood as underprotected by a liability 
remedy of damages. 
 Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion gave a diametrically 
opposed rationale for the Court’s declaration that the statutory definition of 
patent as property right does not necessarily define the remedy for its 
violation. At the outset, Justice Kennedy rejected the Chief Justice’s view that 
the difficulty of fully protecting patent rights with monetary damages underlies 
a “long tradition” that calls for judges to conserve the property rights in 
patents. In sharp contrast, Kennedy’s opinion invests the equitable nature of 
injunctive relief with a progressive ability to adjust to change: “[I]n many 
instances the nature of the patent being enforced and the economic function of 
the patent holder present considerations quite unlike earlier cases.” Two 
examples are given: first, “industries in which firms use patents not as a basis 
for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing 
fees;” second, “patents over business methods,” which raise significant 
questions of “vagueness and suspect validity.”54 Both examples reflect 
concerns that patent rights to exclude can be questionable barriers to the 
market entry needed for competition to flourish.  
It is no accident that Justice Kennedy’s source for both examples is the 
Federal Trade Commission report entitled “To Promote Innovation: The 
Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy.” It is no accident 
because a fundamental tension emerges at intersections between patent rights 
and competition, a tension between injunctive exclusion from and permitted 
access to patented inventions and the information they embody. A balance 
between access and exclusion is required because both competition and patent 
regimes can promote innovation. Indeed, the constitutional provision 
authorizing Congress to enact patent legislation explicitly defines the purpose 
as promoting progress in science and useful arts. In this light, injunctive relief 
for patent infringement should not be granted, particularly to patent trolls or 
business patent holders, when it results in less progress than competition and 
compulsory licensing.55 Justice Kennedy cautions against the dangers of 
                                                 
53 Id. (joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsberg and Antonin Scalia) (emphasis in 
original). 
54 Id. at 1842 (Justice Kennedy joined by Justices Stevens, Souter & Breyer) (for all 
quotations in the paragraph). 
55 Id. (FTC Report). “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times, to Authors and Inventors, the exclusive Right to their respective 
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excessive patent protection and, with it, inadequate regard for competition as a 
powerful means to promote progress through innovation. 
 The implicit competition logic driving Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
emerges even more emphatically in Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent from the 
Metabolite decision. Justice Breyer’s opinion questions the wisdom of 
dismissing the writ earlier granted in a case that addresses the fundamental 
patent imperative to “[e]xclude from . . . patent protection . . . laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”56 
 What is so important about this issue? In Justice Breyer’s view, 
granting a “monopoly over a basic scientific relationship” upsets a careful 
balance embodied in patent rights: “[S]ometimes too much patent protection 
can impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ the 
constitutional objective of patent and copyright protection.”57 
Justice Breyer was concerned about public access to “the basic tools of 
scientific and technological work” and, as such, to “part of the storehouse of 
knowledge and manifestations of laws of nature as free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none.” The rationale for free access lies in the public policy to 
promote progress by encouraging “development and the further spread of 
useful knowledge itself.”58 This of course is standard fare in the discourse of 
intellectual property rights. Indeed, this balancing approach to determining the 
metes and bounds of patent rights has been adopted in well-settled Court 
precedent, in the FTC Report on patent rights and competition, as well as in 
Justice Kennedy’s eBay concurring opinion – all of which appear throughout 
Justice Breyer’s footnote references.  
What exactly is this balancing approach to patent rights? Justice 
Breyer incorporates it by reference to the landmark decision in Bonito Boats 
(1989). There Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote for the Court:  
 
                                                                                                                     
Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. Const’n, Art. I, Sec. 8, para. 8. On the difficulties of 
determining whether a particular doctrine or policy promotes progress, see Peritz, 
APatents and Competition: Toward a Knowledge Theory of Progress,@ working paper 
presented 14 June 2006, at AALS Workshop on Intellectual Property Rights, 
Vancouver, B.C., and 4 September 2006, at 2006 ATRIP Congress: Intellectual 
Property and Market Power, Parma, Italy; working paper posted at 
http://www.aals.org/documents/2006intprop/PeritzPaper.pdf and at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers2/Peritz.doc (IP Scholars Conf., 
August 2006). 
56 126 S.Ct. at 2922 (Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens & Souter, dissenting 
from opinion to dismiss writ of certiorari as improvidently granted). 
57 Id. at 2925 (citations omitted). 
58 Id. at 2923 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage 
innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without 
any concomitant advance in the “Progress of Science and useful Arts.” . . . 
[T]he stringent . . . novelty and nonobviousness requirements express a 
congressional determination that the purposes behind the Patent Clause are 
best served by free competition and exploitation of either that which is 
already available to the public or that which may be readily discerned from 
publicly available material.59 
 
Justice Breyer was reminding his readers that the patent regime begins, as 
Justice O’Connor put it, with “the baseline of free competition . . . [from] 
which the protection of a federal patent is the exception.”60 To establish the 
proper level of patent protection, courts must recognize the importance, indeed 
the primacy, of competition to promote progress by innovation. And so Justice 
Breyer concludes his opinion in Metabolite with references to competition 
policy – not only the Bonito Boats decision but also the FTC Report and 
former FTC Commissioner Robert Pitofsky’s article on antitrust and 
intellectual property rights.61 
The three patent cases each address one aspect of this balancing 
jurisprudence: granting rights to exclude competitors only with respect non-
obvious inventions, determining the propriety of exclusionary remedies by 
equitable principles rather than by a property logic of patent ownership, and 
finally, maintaining public access to “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas.” Every one of these three elements functions as a limit on the 
exclusionary power of patent protection. Each one widens public access to 
inventions or to the knowledge embodied in those inventions. The result is 
increased play for the patent regime’s internal baseline policy of free 
competition by innovation. 
 
Concluding Observations  
 
Together, the opinions in these six cases offer some insights into the 
Roberts Court’s attitudes toward two overlapping competition regimes: 
Antitrust is well-understood in terms of competition policy, although the 
content is unstable and disjointed. But adequate attention has not been given 
the competition policies working within intellectual property regimes, 
including the patent and trademark precincts visited in this brief excursion 
through the Roberts Court’s early jurisprudence. While this small sample is 
                                                 
59 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146, 150 (1989); 
Metabolite, 126 S.Ct. at 2926 (citing 489 U.S. at 146). 
60 489 U.S. at 156, 151. 
61 126 S.Ct. at 2929. 
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not enough to make broad generalizations, a few preliminary observations are 
warranted.  
First, the patent regime harbors competition process values involving 
the production of market information. Patent policy insists on the importance 
of access to new knowledge for furthering not only scientific research but also 
commercial development of new products. In determining how to promote 
progress by innovation, policy makers must balance the benefits of patent 
rights to exclude competitors against the benefits of access to the knowledge 
needed for competition by innovation. 
Second, the trademark regime also includes competition process 
values involving the production of information. But here, the nature of the 
information is different and thus the calculus changes. Trademarks are seen as 
improving competition when they create signposts inviting consumers to 
(re)turn to a product or service that satisfied their expectations or those of a 
trusted third party. This information has public value to the extent it lowers 
consumer search costs and so long as the regime maintains the integrity of the 
information reflected in the marks. But there is controversy over the 
informational value of trademarks and the advertising used to publicize them. 
Even when not misleading, distinctive marks can allow their owners to 
develop market power, allowing them to charge higher prices for differentiated 
products with functionally identical substitutes. Nevertheless, trademark 
protection does reflect a form of competition policy. 
Third and finally, antitrust jurisprudence, including that of the Roberts 
Court, sometimes applies or assumes intellectual property rights as 
justifications for restraining the kind of free competition imagined by antitrust 
policy without taking into account the internal competition policies working in 
the precincts of patent and trademark rights.  
In sum, the six cases discussed appear to reflect a discontinuity in 
intersecting competition regimes: The three antitrust decisions treat intellectual 
property issues in the purely property logic of exclusionary rights while the 
range of opinions directly involving intellectual property rights seek to limit 
their reach and, in consequence, effect an expansion of internal competition 
policies. For now, the observations themselves are a first step. For the future, 
there looms the difficult enterprise of harmonizing the intersecting competition 
policies carried forward in the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence. 
 
